Recent work has noted an increase in the number of parties at the national level in both proportional and majoritarian electoral systems. While the conventional wisdom maintains that the incentives provided by the electoral system will prevent the number of parties at the district level from exceeding two in majoritarian systems, the evidence presented here demonstrates otherwise. I argue that this has occurred because the number of cleavages articulated by parties has increased as several third parties have begun articulating cleavages that are not wellrepresented by the two larger parties.
Recent work by Robin Best notes a divergence at the national level in the number of parties winning legislative representation and the number of parties competing for and winning votes. 1 In both majoritarian and proportional systems, the number of parties winning votes has increased since the Second World War. However, the number of parties winning seats in majoritarian systems has remained closer to two than in proportional systems, where the number of parties winning seats has increased in relative proportion to the number of parties winning votes.
Best notes the possibility that the discrepancy in majoritarian systems between the number of parties winning seats and the far greater number of parties winning votes reflects 'increasing irrationality' on the part of voters in these systems, with voters knowingly supporting parties without any chance of winning representation. However, it remains to be seen whether this is the case. It could be that these national-level results appear 'irrational' only in the aggregate, while at the district and individual levels, voters may still conform to the two-party expectations of strategic voting theory. As Gary Cox notes, parties may encounter 'coordination failures' (which refer to the inability of parties to compete effectively across all districts) that lead to their total replacement by a locally-strong third party at the district level, thereby leaving only two parties competing in each district while competition at the national level features more than two parties. 2 This paper probes these issues further. Specifically, it looks at the number of parties competing for and winning votes at the district level in order to determine whether the number of parties conforms to the two-party expectations consistent with strategic voting theory, or whether voters are displaying patterns of 'increasing irrationality' and supporting multiparty competition at the district level. The results are important because they speak to the larger debate between the two major explanations for the number of parties observed cross-nationally. One explanation-the institutional approach-maintains that the number of parties is determined by the proportionality of the electoral system, predicting that the number of parties in each district will converge on two in countries operating under first-past-the-post (FPTP). The other explanation-the social cleavage approach-maintains that the number of parties is determined by the number of cleavages; as the number of cleavages increases, the number of parties increases. Should the number of parties converge on two, this would demonstrate that the institutional approach remains valid despite the national-level evidence of increasing party system size presented by Best. However, should the number of parties exceed two at the district level, this would provide evidence in favour of the social cleavage approach.
To preview the findings, this paper demonstrates that the number of parties choosing to contest elections and winning votes increasingly exceeds two-party predictions in three countries operating under FPTP: Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand (prior to 1993). In order to explain these findings, I develop an explanation that is rooted in the social cleavage approach.
The number of parties has increased in these countries as the number of cleavages articulated by party elites has increased. Third parties have pursued strategies that are irrational according to the strategic voting literature, competing in most districts in order to represent groups of voters who are present to some degree in every district and who are not well-represented by the existing parties.
Electoral Systems, Strategic Voting, and Coordination Failures
The conventional wisdom maintains that the number of parties observed cross-nationally owes much to the proportionality of the electoral system. Following the seminal work by Duverger, 3 this literature holds that the number of parties tends toward two in countries using FPTP, while multiparty systems tend to be found in countries using proportional representation (PR) electoral systems. Duverger posited two reasons for why this occurs. One is the mechanical effect of electoral systems, or how votes are translated into seats: FPTP systems tend to produce more disproportional seats-votes ratios, while PR systems tend to produce seat shares that more proportionally reflect parties' vote shares. 4 The other and perhaps more powerful effect is psychological. Anticipating the mechanical effect, voters will strategically desert their most-preferred candidates in favour of less-preferred candidates if they anticipate that votes for their most-preferred candidates will be wasted (and possibly resulting in victory for their leastpreferred candidates). For their part, parties will forgo expenditures on districts they do not expect to win. 5 The prediction that strategic voting will produce two-party convergence has been (re-)affirmed by a number of works. 6 Because only one candidate is elected per district, the psychological effect should be strongest in FPTP systems, diminishing as district magnitude increases.
A considerable body of evidence has been amassed demonstrating this strategic voting phenomenon among voters. 7 Examining the system-level consequences of strategic voting, numerous studies have found that the number of parties is greater in countries operating under PR than majoritarian systems like FPTP. 8 While most studies focus on the number of parties at the national level, the psychological effect applies most clearly at the district level. As Cox has noted, the number of parties competing at the national level may exceed two, yet the number of parties competing in any one district may still conform to the predictions of strategic voting theory and remain at (or below) two. 9 Referring to coordination failures, Cox notes that one of the two major parties may strategically exit a district in which a third party with locally-strong support-support that makes the party more competitive than the two major parties-also contests that district.
Although evidence examining the number of parties at the district level has found that the institutional effects apply at the district level much like they do at the national level, 10 other studies have found that district-level party systems exceed the two-party predictions made by the institutional approach. Examining the case of Canada, Brian Gaines noted that the number of parties competing at the district level exceeded two throughout most of the twentieth century. 11 Gaines found similar evidence when looking at the United Kingdom in the period following the 1960s. 12 Others have found that the number of parties at the district level often exceeds two in India, where the number of parties appears to be impacted significantly by the choices made by party elites to contest or not contest certain districts. 13 Thus, while the institutional approach predicts that the number of parties competing in any one district in countries operating under FPTP should not exceed two, there is reason to believe that the number of parties at the district level exceeds two much like Best has noted with regard to national-level party systems.
Elite Agency and the Social Cleavage Approach
The major alternative explanation maintains that the number of parties is determined more by the number of social cleavages than the proportionality of the electoral system. 14 Because parties emerge to represent the interests of particular social groups to the exclusion of others, increases in the number of cleavages place strains on the existing parties' ability to represent these new groups of voters. This can be seen early in the twentieth century with the extension of universal (male) suffrage, which incorporated working-class voters who were essential to the fortunes of socialist and labour parties targeting their support (and difficult for the existing liberal and conservative parties to represent credibly). 15 More recently, the emergence of postmaterial voters has put pressure upon the existing parties either to adapt to represent this new base of voters and risk alienating their existing bases of support, or to risk losing this potential base of voters to another (third) party. 16 Given these challenges of representation, the number of parties may increase as the number of cleavages present in a given district increases, despite the incentives of the electoral system.
While much of the early work in this tradition assumed that the articulation of cleavages by party elites would be automatic, a growing body of literature suggests that elites have considerable agency in determining which cleavages to articulate. 17 The interplay of social cleavages and elite articulation can be seen with regard to the evolution of party competition in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Caramani notes that the emergence of competitive elections was determined by the decisions taken by party elites to represent certain cleavages over others. 18 As the incentives for controlling the machinery of government became more alluring, parties chose to de-emphasise the issues associated with the territorial (urban-rural, regional, etc.) cleavages they had traditionally represented in favour of issues related to functional (class, religious, etc.) cleavages that were present across most districts. This choice allowed them to compete effectively for votes in most districts (thus improving their chances of winning a majority of seats). While this understanding of cleavage articulation differs from definitions found in some of the most prominent works (e.g. Bartolini and Mair), it corresponds with more recent definitions of the term cleavage in ways that retain the focus on parties'
representation of issues associated with certain social groups to the exclusion of others, while recognising the considerable agency possessed by party actors in deciding which issues to articulate and which groups to represent. 19 This agency may impact the number of parties. For instance, because parties represent certain groups to the exclusion of others, the major parties may choose not to articulate cleavages that do not fit well with their existing bases of support, particularly if these parties are already able to control the machinery of government with their existing bases of support (as has been the case with the two largest parties in each country operating under FPTP examined below).
Additionally, if third parties do not articulate issues associated with these cleavages, the wouldbe support for these third parties either goes to the existing parties (or these voters fail to turn out); if third parties do choose to articulate issues associated with these new cleavages, the number of parties will increase beyond two.
In sum, the literature rooted in the social cleavage approach provides an explanation for why the increasing size of Western party systems observed by Best at the national level may be mirrored at the district level. If the number of parties competing for and winning votes at the district level converges on two, this would provide evidence in favour of the institutional approach. If the number of parties exceeds two, particularly if sustained over an extended period, this would provide evidence in favour of the social cleavage approach.
The Number of Parties Winning Votes
Turning to the empirical evidence, this section examines whether the number of parties winning votes at the district level exceeds the two-party predictions made by the institutional approach in FPTP systems. There is need for additional research focusing directly upon FPTP systems. Previous research has concluded that institutional and social cleavage effects appear to interact with one another. 20 However, while these studies help to explain differences in the number of parties at the same level of electoral system proportionality in PR systems, the interactive effects seen in these studies lead to the conclusion that the effects of social cleavages do not produce multiparty systems in FPTP systems. Consequently, these studies fail to explain why the number of parties might exceed two in FPTP systems. Thus, further study of FPTP systems is needed. To this end, the data in this study focus upon three countries operating under FPTP: Canada (covering the years from 1867-2011), the United Kingdom (from 1832-2010), and
New Zealand (from 1905-1993, prior to the adoption of a mixed-member proportional system). 21 Focusing on Canada and the United Kingdom (where previous research has found that the number of parties exceeds two) in addition to New Zealand (which has received little attention in previous research) allows one to examine whether the forces thought to be leading the number of parties to exceed two in Canada and the United Kingdom are also present in New Zealand.
Despite the small number of countries examined here, the findings from these cases are quite generalisable. Because these three countries have relied exclusively on the same FPTP electoral system throughout most of the period under study (particularly the period following the Second World War when the number of parties at the national level increased beyond two), 22 the primary institutional effect argued to be associated with party system size-the proportionality of the electoral system-is held constant. As a result, any deviations from two-party predictions in these three countries would suggest that these processes are capable of occurring in more proportional systems, where the electoral system poses less of a barrier to new party entry.
Additionally, while focusing solely on FPTP countries helps to minimize electoral system variance, these three countries do vary in terms of other variables thought to be necessary for the emergence of multiparty systems. Namely, these three cases allow me to examine what effects of federalism, party financing, and partisan dealignment have had on the number of parties. If district-level party systems in all three countries are exceed two-party predictions, then these additional variables cannot explain the emergence of multiparty systems at the district level.
To measure the number of parties, I use the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP). 23 
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Before proceeding further, one should note that these patterns rule out three other prominent explanations for district-level party systems in excess of two-party predictions.
Several recent works argue that because issues differ at the federal and provincial levels, federalism may give rise to third parties with support bases in certain regions that allow them to compete successfully at the district level with the larger, more nationalised parties. 27 However, the fact that Canada is the only federal system of the three countries examined here, paired with the fact that mean district-level ENEP exceeds two-party expectations in each country, demonstrates that federalism is not a necessary cause of multiparty systems. While Gaines has While major-party dealignment likely improved the chances for third parties to appeal to voters dissatisfied with the two larger parties, the data presented here clearly show that dealignment was not necessary for the development of multiparty competition.
To summarize, the data presented here clearly show that the number of parties exceeds the two-party predictions made by the institutional approach for district-level races. While the data presented in this section do not decisively support the social cleavage approach, the fact that the patterns of party competition at the district level do not conform to the institutional approach and do not appear to conform to other explanations for deviations from two-party predictions provides tentative support. In the next section, I examine the emergence of some of the key third parties in each country to show more conclusively how the social cleavage approach is at work, leading the number of parties to exceed two at the district level.
The Evolution of Multiparty Competition
Evidence in favour of the social cleavage approach can be seen when looking at the patterns of district contestation, particularly for some of the major third parties, over time.
Specifically, I examine the proportion of districts contested by the major parties in each country, similar to Caramani, who notes that the nationalization of parties' electoral strategies and support reflects the types of cleavage groups targeted. 33 Figures 2, 3 , and 4 present the proportion of districts contested by the major parties in Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, respectively. Before proceeding to the country-specific analyses, one should note some general patterns. At the beginning of the time series in each country, the proportion of districts contested by each party is quite variable, ranging from highs around .9 for the Liberal Party in New
Zealand to a low of .35 for the Canadian Liberals in 1867. Over time, the two largest parties in each country begin to contest nearly every district, consistent with the discussion in Carmani noting the evolution of competitive elections resulting from the decisions of elites to target more functional (instead of territorial) cleavages. 34 During the period following the Second World War examined by Best, the two largest parties in each country contest nearly every district. By as early as 1954 and as late as 1974, the major third party examined in each country also contests the same proportion of districts as the two largest parties. was competing in over 80 per cent. It is interesting to note that prior to the emergence of the CCF in 1935, mean district-level ENEP was just over two; since then, mean district ENEP has rarely fallen below 2.5. 35 The incentive to contest most, if not all, districts originated in the fact that the party has appealed to working class voters (and others sympathetic to the party's socialdemocratic appeals) in all professions, voters who are present to some degree in every district. 36 To borrow Caramani's language, the CCF/NDP appeals to a functional cleavage that the two larger parties have chosen not to articulate, 37 In sum, these figures show that the increases in district-level ENEP observed in Figure 1 coincide with increases in the proportions of districts contested by the major third party in each country. In keeping with the social cleavage approach, the fact that each third party has chosen to articulate and represent functional cleavages not represented by the existing parties reflects an increase in the number of cleavages in each country; in other words, the increases in district-level ENEP appear due to increases in the number of cleavages articulated by parties. Because each of the third parties has chosen to articulate functional cleavages-with voters belonging to these cleavages present to some degree in most districts-these parties have defied the expectations of strategic voting theory and contested nearly every district in order to represent their targeted base of voters.
Conclusion
Inspired by the findings presented in Best, noting that the number of parties competing for-and winning-votes at the national level in countries operating under FPTP increasingly exceeds two over the past several decades, this paper has sought to determine whether the same processes have occurred at the district level. While the institutional literature predicts that the number of parties should not exceed two at the district level even if the number of parties exceeds two nationally, 45 the evidence presented here is more consistent with the social cleavage approach, which predicts that the number of parties may increase beyond two as the number of cleavages increases. Even if one allows for some deviation from two-party predictions, and even if one uses a measure of the number of parties that is biased in favour of the institutional approach, the fact remains that the number of parties increasingly deviates from two-party expectations.
Examining the patterns of party competition of the most important third parties behind the increases in the number of parties demonstrates that these parties are pursuing strategies that allow them to compete for voters belonging to the cleavages they represent, competing in nearly every district despite the fact that such strategies are 'irrational' according to strategic voting theory. Although the data presented here do not bring evidence to bear that directly measures variables associated with the social cleavage approach, previous studies have shown that patterns of party competition reflect the social-group bases of parties' support; 46 because each third party examined here represents issues and values that resonate with certain groups of voters more than others, and because the patterns of third party competition presented above match the findings of previous work, the conclusions reached here accord with previous literature.
While the evidence clearly shows that the number of parties exceeds the expectations of the institutional approach (and the strategic voting literature upon which this literature is based), the mechanisms preventing strategic voting incentives from limiting the number of parties to two in any one district are not fully understood. The strategic voting literature acknowledges several assumptions; without meeting these assumptions, strategic voting will not occur and the number of parties will exceed two. 47 However, there is precious little research specifically examining whether the absence of these factors does indeed prevent strategic voting, let alone the frequency and degree to which these assumptions are met. 48 Further research is needed to determine which of these assumptions is most crucial for two-party convergence, or whether other factors are preventing the emergence of multiparty competition, in order to understand why third parties like those examined here have not been strategically deserted by their supporters. 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 Year
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